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In this note, we dene a model of product dierentiation with two-variants of
the same good which, depending on the number of consumers prefering, at equal
price, one variant to the other, provides equilibrium prices reecting a natural
valuation of these variants by the market. By natural valuation, we mean that
these prices share the following properties: (i) when one variant is prefered at
equal price by a larger number of consumers than the other, its price is larger
at equilibrium;(ii) when the number of those prefering one variant to the other
at equal price is equal to the number of consumers in the whole population,
we obtain the equilibrium prices corresponding to a "pure" vertical product
dierentiation model ; (iii) when this number is exactly equal to a half of the
consumers' population, we get the "pure" horizontal product dierentiation
model with equal price at equilibrium for both variants; and, nally (iv) when
this number tends to the number of consumers in the whole population, the
corresponding equilibrium prices converge to the equilibrium prices of a simple
duopoly model in which all consumers prefer one variant to the other when they
are sold at equal price.
In the analysis of price competition with dierentiated products, it is tra-
ditional to distinguish between horizontal and vertical product dierentiation
(see for instance, Beath and Katsoulacos (1991). Two products are horizontally
dierentiated when, sold at the same price, some consumers prefer to buy one
variant while the remaining consumers prefer to buy the other one. Two prod-
ucts are vertically dierentiated when, sold at the same price, all consumers
prefer to buy one variant than the other. The paradigm of horizontal dierenti-
ation corresponds to the model proposed by Hotelling (1929) to analyze spatial
competition. Two rms located at the extremities of a linear market sell the
same homogeneous product. If the rms quote the same price, all consumers
located at the right of the middle point of this linear market buy from the rm
located at the right extremity of it, while those located at its left buy from the
rm located at its left extremity. Vertical product dierentiation corresponds
to dierentiation by quality: when sold at the same price, all consumers would
prefer to buy the high quality variant of a product rather than its standard
counterpart. For instance, when a TV-set broadcasting black and white images
has to be bought at the same price than a colour TV, all consumers would prefer
to buy at that price the latter than the former.
The two concepts dened above cover extreme cases of product dierenti-
ation. In many real situations, the variants eectively oered in the industry
do not correspond exactly to the conditions required to fall into one of these
two categories. For instance, in the case of spatial competition, rms can be
located in the linear market in such a manner that almost all consumers would
prefer to buy from one of the two rms, in spite of the fact that these rms set
the same price. Suppose indeed that rm 2 is located at the right extremity of
the linear market while rm 1 stands very close to it. Due to transportation
costs, almost all consumers buy from rm 1 when it quotes the same price as
rm 2. Thus, this situation corresponds closely to the denition of vertical dif-
1ferentiation, even if, sensu stricto, it should fall into the alternative category.
Similarly, it is rather uncommon that two variants of the same good can be
unanimously ranked in terms of their quality attributes. In most situations,
when two variants of the same good are oered to consumers,and even when a
very large number of them agree on their ranking, one can almost surely nd
some of them who prefer the reverse ordering. Think of cars for example. One
should a priori expect consumers' utility to increase with the size of the cockpit
or the number of seats. However some of them, even few, might prefer a car
with a smaller cockpit or a smaller number of seats, simply because it provides
more intimacy. This is often the case when the product is identied by several
attributes, with utility increasing along one of them, and possibly decreasing
for some consumers along another.
In all these intermediate cases, it is dicult to assert whether these situa-
tions correspond closerly to vertical than horizontal dierentiation, or vice-versa.
However, given two variants of the same product, the number of consumers who
at equal price prefer one variant to the other provides an interesting information
about how the corresponding variants are dierentiated. First, notice that the
extreme cases of pure vertical or horizontal dierentiation correspond to specic
values of this number. When the total number of consumers prefer at equal
price variant 1 (resp. variant 2) to variant 2 (resp. variant 1), we obtain the
"pure" vertical product dierentiation, with variant 1 (resp. 2) of higher quality
than variant 2 (resp. 1). Similarly, when this number is exactly equal to a half of
the consumers' population, we get the "pure" horizontal product dierentiation
paradigm. Then, in the intermediate cases, the number of consumers who at
equal price prefer one variant to the other does not correspond to the whole
population of consumers, or to half of it. However, if a strict majority ranks at
equal price one variant higher than the other, it can be viewed as if the society
as a whole prefers that variant. Then, it is natural to think that the market
should value higher the former than the latter since it is prefered by a majority
of consumers.This would require that, at equilibrium, the price of the former
should exceed the price of the latter. Notice that this property generally holds
in the models capturing the extreme cases of pure vertical product dierentia-
tion: most price competition models considered in the literature lead to a higher
price at equilibrium for the high quality rm (see for instance Gabszewicz and
Thisse (1979) or Shaked and Sutton (1982)). Similarly, in spatial competition
models  a la Hotelling, one must naturally require that equilibrium prices are
equal when rms are located at the extremities of the linear market, which is
indeed the case in the Hotelling's location model1.
We provide in this note a simple model of product dierentiation, parametrized
by the number of consumers prefering one variant to the other at equal price.
The corresponding equilibrium prices share all the properties listed above for a
natural market valuation of the variants.
1In this model, equilibrium prices are also equal when rms are located symmetrically
around the center of the linear market : at such pairs of location, an equal number of consumers
prefer one rm to the other, and vice-versa.
2The model is introduced in section 1 while the equilibrium analysis is pro-
vided in section 2. We end up with a short conclusion.
2 The model
Two rms sell each a variant of the same good, produced at zero cost. There
are two types of consumers. Consumers of type 1 prefer variant 1 to variant 2
at equal price and, similarly, those of type 2 prefer variant 2 to variant 1 under
the same condition. Consumers make mutually exclusive single unit purchases.
Consumers of each type are ranked in [0;1] according to the amount  they would
be willing to pay to accept to consume their least prefered variant when both
these variants are sold at the same price. .Consumers of type 1 are uniformly
distributed on T1 = [0;1], with density equal to  , and similarly for consumers
of type 2 distributed on T2 =[0;1], with density 1   : Utility U2
1() for good 2
for consumers of type  2 T1 denes as
U2
1() = U   ( + p2);
with U a constant suciently large to guarantee that at equilibrium, all the
market is served by one or the other variant. The utility for good 1 U1
1() for
consumers in T1 is given by
U1
1() = U   p1:
Utility for good 2 U2
2() for consumers of type  2 T2 denes as
U2
2() = U   p2;
while utility for good 1 U1
2() for consumers in  2 T2 is given by
U1
2() = U   ( + p1):
3 Equilibrium analysis
Suppose  < 1
2:Then no consumer in T1 buys variant 2 when p2 > p1 while there
exists a type of consumer (p1;p2) in [0;1] = T2 who is indierent between the
two variants, namely, (p1;p2) dened by the equality
U   p2 = U   ( + p1);
or
(p1;p2) = p2   p1:
3It follows that demands to the rms at prices (p1;p2); with p2 > p1; are dened
by
D1(p1;p2) =  + (1   )(p1;p2)
=  + (1   )(p2   p1)
for rm 1, and
D2(p1;p2) = (1   (p1;p2))(1   )
= (1   (p2   p1))(1   ):
for rm 2, respectively. The resulting prots are concave and given by
1(p1;p2) = ( + (1   )(p2   p1))p1
and
2(p1;p2) = ((1   (p2   p1))(1   ))p2:
The rst order conditions obtain as
@
@p1 (( + (1   )(p2   p1))p1) =    2p1 + p2 + 2p1   p2 = 0;
@
@p2 (((1   (p2   p1))(1   ))p2) = p1      2p2   p1 + 2p2 + 1 = 0:










First we have assumed that p1 < p2: That this condition holds at the can-







2() ,  2 (0; 1
2):
Now let us consider this model "at the limit", when  is exactly equal to
zero. The system of demands then reduces to
D1(p1;p2) = p2   p1
D2(p1;p2) = 1   (p2   p1);
with corresponding prots
1(p1;p2) = (p2   p1)p1
2(p1;p2) = (1   (p2   p1))p2:
This system of demands corresponds to the limit model of vertical dierentia-
tion, in which everybody prefers good 2 to good 1 ( = 0).The corresponding










4We notice that lim!0 fp
1()g = 1
3 and lim!0 fp
2()g = 2
3 : when  tends
to zero, the model gets closer and closer to a situation of vertical dierentiation,
in which a larger and larger majority prefers variant 2 to variant 1 (1  tends to
1), and the corresponding equilibrium prices converge to the equilibrium prices
in the limit model.
Finally, notice that when  = 1
2; equilibrium prices are equal to each other
and equal to one.
It is easy to check that the equilibrium analysis covering the case when
1
2 <  < 1 is, mutatis mutandis, identical to the preceding one: rm 2 now
plays the role of rm 1 in the denition of demands and prots, rm 1 selling
now the variant prefered by the majority.
Thus we may summarize the above results in the following
Proposition 1 (pure vertical dierentiation model): when the set of consumers
prefering variant i to variant j at equal price,i 6= j; co ncides with the whole





Proposition 2 (pure horizontal dierentiation model): when the number of
consumers prefering variant i to variant j at equal price is exactly equal to a half
of the consumers' population ( = 1
2) , both prices are equal to 1 at equilibrium;
Proposition 3 (intermediate models): when the number of consumers prefer-
ing variant i to variant j at equal price satises 0 <  < 1; (i) the variant with
a smaller number of consumers who prefer it at equal price has a lower price
at equilibrium than the other; (ii) the higher the number of consumers prefering
one variant to the other, the higher the price at equilibrium for that variant; (iii)
when  ! 0 or  ! 1; equilibrium prices in the intermediate models converge
to the equilibrium prices in the pure vertical dierentiation model :
Thus we conclude that, whatever the number of consumers who prefer one
variant to the other, the corresponding equilibrium prices share all the properties
listed above for a natural market valuation of the variants.
4 Conclusion
We have provided in this note a simple model of product dierentiation allowing
a natural valuation of the variants by the market. The demand system, and the
corresponding equilibrium prices, depend on the number of consumers prefering
one variant to the other in the population of consumers. The analog for this
model of pure vertical dierentiation leads to equilibrium prices which are the
limit of the equilibrium prices corresponding to situations in which the density
of the population which prefers one variant to the other tends to one. Similarly,
the analog of the pure horizontal product dierentiation model has equilibrium
prices which are equal. Finally, the larger the density prefering one variant to
the other at equal price, the higher the price of that variant at equilibrium.
5It would be interesting to identify, in an extended model of product dier-
entiation, similar properties at equilibrium for the case where the number of
variants exceeds two.
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